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Abstract
Payslips are supposed to notify employees about wage-related information, enabling them
to adjust their labor supply, when appropriate. However, payslips are often information-
laden and complex to understand, casting doubt on whether they are adequately up to the
task, potentially resulting in inefficient labor supply reactions. In a real-effort laboratory
experiment we use a variety of information frames to potentially support a better under-
standing of wage related information. We find that participants strongly react to changes of
incidental wage costs, yet the framing of payslips has no additional effect on people’s labor
supply. Nevertheless, including simple graphics increases comprehension and readability.
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1 Introduction
In employment relations, employees typically receive regular payslips, indicating their salary
received for a certain employment period. Such payslips often include information on gross wage,
net wage and (parts of) incidental wage costs (IWC) such as income taxes or social insurance
contributions. From a public policy perspective, it can be reasonable to legally require the regular
distribution of salary information via payslips as this could help employees to avoid making
inefficient labor market choices. While tax codes can be very specific in that payslips should be
clear and comprehensible, there are typically no binding regulations with regard to their specific
design, layout or framing.1 In fact, many payslips actually appear to be rather information-
laden and complex to understand. Employees, in turn, may not be able to fully comprehend
the information provided. Based on their imperfect understanding, employees might fail to react
accurately to changes in incidental wage costs, potentially resulting in inefficient labor market
outcomes (e.g., Abeler and Ja¨ger, 2015).
Over the last decade, applying behavioral economic interventions has become very popular
in a variety of different public policy contexts (BIT, 2019; OECD, 2017). Among others, also the
instrument of framing has been shown to lead to better perceptions of decision environments (e.g.,
Hossain and List, 2012; Kahneman, 2003; Ku¨hberger, 1998). Therefore, in this research note,
we report a laboratory experiment designed to analyze the effect of various framings of payslips
on people’s reactions to changes in incidental wage costs. We use different framings based on
insights of the behavioral design literature to make payslips easier to read. We expect that varying
information framings differentially increases the salience and comprehension of applicable wage
deductions and therefore has a nuanced impact on labor supply in the experiment.
We find that a change in the overall amount of incidental wages costs drastically affects
output, while there is no differential effect of our framing efforts. Hence, we find no evidence
that the framing of payslips changes labor supply decisions. Nevertheless, complementary results
indicate that participants appreciate detailed non-technical and graphical information.
2 Experimental Design
We study the effects of framed payslips (between subjects) in an experimental labor market with
changing incidental wage costs (within subject) in the lab. In order to observe potential changes
in the efficiency of labor supply decisions, we use a real effort task that has convex costs of work
and simultaneously provide a paid “free time” option (with constant earnings per time), resulting
in an interior solution (Sausgruber et al., 2019).2
Subjects worked for four stages. After each stage, participants received a payslip, summariz-
1For example, the Austrian income tax code (§ 78(5)) states: “The employer must provide the employee with a
written, clear, comprehensible and complete statement of the salary (remuneration and expense allowances) paid
in the calendar month . . . ”
2For details see online appendix.
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ing their task performance and money earnings.
Subjects were randomly allocated to one of six different information conditions. Participants
in the control condition received a payslip that mimics payslips currently widely used in Austria.
In the framing treatments, in addition to the status quo payslip, a cover sheet with additional
information was provided. In the minimum treatment (MIN) subjects received a transparent
listing of total personnel cost to the employer as well as gross and net income values.3 In the
minimum gross treatment (MIN gross), subjects received additional information on the deduc-
tions on behalf of the employer and the employee, separately. In the minimum gross graphical
treatment (MIN-G gross), additionally, a graph visualized the amount of deductions. In the
minimum gross calender treatment (MIN-C gross), a calender icon denoted the amount of cor-
rectly solved letter sequences needed in order to pay the complete labor taxes.4 The maximum
treatment (MAX-G gross) is the same as MIN-G gross, but provided an exhaustive list of all
different positions of deductions rather than only their sums. Figure 1 provides a schematic
overview. The actually used remuneration sheets are in the online appendix.
Figure 1: Schematic overview of experimental conditions
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In order to control for potential number size effects, i.e., people judge numbers differently
depending on their absolute size (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998), we parameterized the experiment
such that the expected income from the experiment (i.e., 2300 Tokens) - in numbers - closely
corresponds to the actual average gross monthly income in Austria (i.e., 2300 e, Statistik Austria,
2019).
Specifically, subjects earned 300 experimental Tokens per correctly solved sequence of letters
and received 200 experimental Tokens per 10 seconds in the free-time option, if applicable. Each
stage lasted 180 seconds. These values remained constant across control and treatment conditions
3Total personnel cost is the sum of the net income of employees plus all incidental wage costs of both employers
and employees. Gross income refers to net income plus the incidental wage costs on behalf of the employees only.
Austria uses a progressive tax system, hence depending on the income level, employers and employees pay different
shares of the total incidental wage costs.
4This treatment refers to a real-life application of the tax freedom day, i.e., the day in a given year when a
person has earned enough income to just pay his/her taxes.
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and also across the four stages. Participants’ income (but not their earnings from the free-time
option) was reduced by incidental wage costs (IWC).5 In the first two stages, these IWC were set
to a value of 40% (average IWC for Austrian median income earners). In stages three and four,
the IWC was exogenously either reduced to 20% or increased to 60% (within subject). With this
element of the design it is possible to study whether our framing of the remuneration statements
interacts with the amount of the deduction burden.
A total of 273 subjects participated in the experiment at the VCEE lab (University of Vi-
enna). We recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and implemented the experiment in oTree
(Chen et al., 2016). Instructions were read aloud. Additionally, participants completed a short
questionnaire with questions concerning their decision-making, demographics and attitudes to-
wards the received remuneration statements.6 Subjects received payments for each of the stages,
which were paid out in person and cumulatively at the end of the session. The average payment
per subject was EUR 14.90. The average duration of the experiment was 50 minutes.
3 Results
Figure 2 shows the main results of our study. In all treatments subjects react markedly to changes
of the incidental wage costs (IWC). When IWC decrease, the number of tasks solved increases,
while the number of task falls, when IWC increase. The differences in distributions of tasks
solved is significantly different between the two IWC changes (Kruskal Wallis test, p < 0.001).
Furthermore, the results on this actual behavior are also in line with a stated measure on the
perceived burden of deductions (see online appendix). Comparing participants’ statements on
whether the perceived burden on wage costs is high, those confronted with higher incidental wage
costs also significantly attributed a higher perceived burden (t-test, p < 0.001).
While changes in IWC strongly affect labor supply, the framings do not. Controlling for the
change of IWC, we find no additional effect of the framings on the number of tasks solved, neither
for subjects with decreasing IWC (Kruskal Wallis test, p = 0.566) nor for those with increasing
IWC (p = 0.799).7
Complementary findings In addition to the main results, our behavioral and survey data
shed light on how participants engaged with and perceived the differential framings of payslips.
In terms of engagement with the payment slips we find that participants statistically significantly
increase the time spent to view and study the payslips when compared to the control group (t-
5Note that participants were told that any deductions were collected by and remained with the experimenter.
In order to avoid issues concerning deception, the instructions made clear that the payslips were displayed for
illustrative purposes only. Nevertheless, judging by previous experimental results, this design choice should not
interfere with identifying differential framing effects (Fleming and Zizzo, 2015).
6Materials can be found in the online appendix. Basic demographic characteristics such as age, gender, political
attitudes and work experience do not vary across the experimental conditions (χ2-tests, all p > 0.170.
7While the incidental wage costs changed at the beginning of stage 3, we are interested in the potential change
in labor supply after receiving an updated (framed) payslip at the end of stage 3. Thus, we report the most
relevant comparison between stages 2 and 4.
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Figure 2: Mean output changes by incidental wage costs and payslip framings
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Note: Error bars denote standard errors of the mean.
tests, all p < 0.050).8 An exception to this observation is the comparison of viewing durations
between MAX-G gross and the control group. Participants in this treatment do not spend more
time viewing the payslip, despite it contained the most information of all treatments (t-test,
p = 0.556). This suggests that subjects partially disregarded the information (possibly due
to information overload). Moreover, in comparison to frames without graphical content (i.e.,
MIN, MIN gross, MIN-C gross), the graphical depiction of IWC in MIN-G gross seems to help
participants to grasp information quicker (t-tests, all p < 0.079).
Furthermore, we asked subjects on their perceived level of informational value of the payslips
on an 11-part Likert scale ranging from non informative (0) to very informative (10). Compared
to the control condition none but the frame MAX-G was perceived to be significantly more
informative (Kruskal Wallis test, p = 0.024). Thus, there seems to be a discrepancy between what
people perceive to be of informational value and how they behave upon having this information.9
Does framing increase efficiency? Given the parametrization of the experiment, an optimal
value for participants to switch to the free-time option can be estimated. As long as participants
8This observation may also be caused by the fact that participants in the framing conditions received the
framed cover sheet in addition to the status quo payslip and thus had to ‘digest’ more information, by design.
9This finding is related to a literature that documents that intentions do not necessarily lead to corresponding
behavior (see e.g., Sheeran and Webb, 2016)
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complete a task within or below nine seconds, it is favorable for them to keep solving tasks.
Above that value, participants should switch to the free-time option.10 Given the time spent on
each task, we can assess the mean individual delta with regard to the optimal time per task.
These mean differences can then be compared across experimental conditions in order to assess
whether less complex and more informational remuneration sheets improve the quality of decision
making across our experimental conditions. However, an analysis of stage two work behavior
(the stage after participants have received payslips for the first time) reveals that there are no
statistical differences when comparing participants’ decision quality across treatments with the
control group (t-tests, all p > 0.266).
4 Conclusion
We report on an experiment designed to analyze the effect of differential framings of payslips on
people’s perceptions of and reactions to changes in incidental wages costs such as labor taxes and
social security contributions. While behavioral interventions such as framings have been shown
to be effective in many domains (Tversky, 2013; De Martino et al., 2006), our results clearly
show that they might cease to trigger behavioral reactions if the perception of the underlying
economic fundamentals is relatively strong.
Clearly, more research is needed to achieve a deeper insight of what the behavioral intervention
of framing can and cannot achieve in diverse (public policy) settings. While framing - in principle
- could be an effective intervention, in our experiment, it did not reduce complexity or increase
the informational value conveyed in specifically layouted payslips. Therefore, our finding begs
the question to what extent framing can be successful in related domains where regular reporting
is mandatory, but the exact framing of which is not subject to strict regulation such as for bank
statements or utility bills.
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Online Appendix
A Further results
A.1 Descriptive statistics
Table A1 contains some descriptive statistics of the control variables used in the experiment.
None of the control variables does vary statistically significantly across treatments, with one
notable exception: the perceived informativeness of the payslips.
Table A1: Descriptive statistics
Control MIN gross MIN MIN-G gross MIN-C gross MAX-G gross
Age 26.10 (24.5) 24.9 (24) 23.27 (23) 24.53 (23) 23.67 (23) 24.91 (23)
Male 0.48 (0) 0.50 (0.5) 0.44 (0) 0.51 (1) 0.50 (0.5) 0.53 (1)
Political preferences 3.54 (3) 3.64 (3) 3.51 (3) 3.77 (3) 3.50 (3) 3.77 (4)
Work experience 24.44 (12) 37.55 (14.5) 17.11 (16) 14.91 (12) 17.40 (12) 21.67 (12)
Informative payslips 5.69 (6) 5.36 (5) 6.29 (6) 6.13 (6) 6.52 (7) 7.33 (8)
Deductions too high 6.98 (7) 7.07 (7) 6.93 (7) 7.02 (7) 7.15 (7) 7.09 (8)
Behavior affected 0.38 (0) 0.43 (0) 0.42 (0) 0.34 (0) 0.35 (0) 0.47 (0)
Note: This table contains means (medians in parentheses)
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A.2 Perceived level of information value
Since more information does not necessarily lead to higher perceived informativeness of the infor-
mation provided (e.g. because of information overload, unclear presentation etc.), we elicited the
subjective perceived informativeness of the payslips presented. As depicted in Figure A30, the
questions asked was “How informative did you find the payslips received in the individual sec-
tions?” and subjects could respond on an 11-part Likert scale ranging from 0 (“not informative”)
to 10 (“very informative”).
Figure A1: Perceived informativeness of the payslips
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Control MIN MIN gross MIN−G gross MIN−C gross MAX−G gross
Treatment
Pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
in
fo
rm
at
iv
en
es
s
Note: Mean responses and 95% confidence intervals
Figure A1 shows a bar graph of the mean responses per treatment as well as 95% confidence
intervals. The only treatment in which the informativeness score differs significantly from the
score of the control treatment is in MAX-G gross, i.e., subjects indicate that they feel best
informed when receiving the full information vector of all deductions.
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A.3 Time spent
Figure A2 shows how long subjects viewed the information provided on the payslips.
Figure A2: Time spent on viewing payslips, by treatment and section
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Note: Mean viewing times in seconds and 95% confidence intervals
The first observation is that subjects became faster over time (on average 13.7 seconds per
period, linear regression: p < 0.001). This is not surprising since it is natural that one needs
a bit longer to get accustomed to certain ways information is presented, but after this learning
phase, information acquisition happened significantly faster.
The second observation is that while there are large time differences across treatments in
section 1 (variance: 1214), these differences become much smaller in section 4 (variance: 122,
Levene’s test: p < 0.001. Interestingly though, the difference between the Max-G gross and the
control condition is never statistically significant (Ranksum tests: all p > 0.100 suggesting that
the rich information provided under Max-G gross might was not viewed in much detail - or was
probably even (partially) disregarded.
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A.4 Efficiency of labor supply
Figure A3: Inefficient overwork, by treatment and section
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Note: Mean overtime worked (above the rational switching point, see Appendix B) in seconds
and 95% confidence intervals
The efficiency of labor supply was not affected by our treatment manipulation, i.e., subjects
did not react more or less rationally to the different framings of payslips (Kruskal Wallis tests,
in all sections: p > 0.100).
B Task details
Subjects generated surplus by counting the frequency of the letter ‘a’ in a sequence of letters. At
first they counted short sequences, which gradually increased in difficulty over time. This task
is simple yet tedious and does not require pre-existing knowledge or mathematical skills.
In each stage they received information on timing aspects, such as how much time they had
used for the current sequence, the time used for the last sequence and the time remaining in a
particular stage. Within stages, participants additionally had the option to stop working and
switch to a “free-time” option.
For each correctly solved sequence participants earned 300 Tokens and for every 10 seconds
spent in free-time they received 200 Tokens. Note that while there were 40% deducted from
any earnings from solving sequences, but not from earnings in free time, each participant should
switch from working on solving the sequences to free time if he/she takes more than (1− 0.4)×
300/200× 10 = 9 seconds.
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C Instructions / screenshots
The experiment was held in German. Thus, all screenshots are in German language. Since all
instructions were only available on screen, a translated version of the instruction texts is provided
below of each screen.
Figure A4: Screen 01
Screen 01 - English
Welcome!
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Figure A5: Screen 02
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Screen 02 - English
Welcome!
Thank you for your participation in this study today. Please follow the following instructions
carefully. These explanations are identical for all participants.
There is an absolute ban on communication during the study. The use of mobile phones is
prohibited. Please turn them off.
Your decisions and inputs are anonymous, i.e. your personal identity cannot be assigned to
your decisions.
For presentation purposes within the study, please enter your name and computer number.
Both data fields will not be evaluated by the study management and will not be disclosed to
other participants within the study. For the analysis these data fields will be deleted immediately
after the experiment.
If you have any questions during the study, please raise your hand. An experimenter will
come to your table and answer your questions.
Depending on your decisions, you can earn money which will be paid to you in cash im-
mediately after the study. How much money you earn depends on your own decisions in the
study.
In this study you can work on different tasks. On the following pages we will give you further
instructions. Make sure you understand the instructions before proceeding to the next page.
You will not be able to view these instructions again.
Do you have any questions?
Continue
14
Figure A6: Screen 03
Screen 03 - English
Instructions
In each section of this study, you can decide whether and how much you want to work.
Your task is to complete tasks within 3 minutes. The tasks consist of counting from a sequence
of letters, the correct number of letters “a”.
In each section of the study, you can decide for yourself how many tasks you want to solve.
You will receive 300 tokens (Tk) per task solved.
You can also decide in any section of the study not to work and choose the so-called “leisure
option”. For every 10 seconds you spend in the Leisure Option, you will receive 200 tokens (Tk).
The calculation is made per second, i.e. if, for example, you spend 14 seconds in the leisure
option, you will receive 280 tokens. Since the difficulty of the task increases with each letter
sequence, there is a time when it is better to choose the “Leisure Option”.
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Figure A7: Screen 04
Screen 04 - English
Instructions
On the next page you have the possibility to try out the task. You will get different sequences
of letters to get a good overview of the tasks. To give an answer to a sequence, press “Enter”. If
your answer is correct, the next sequence will be displayed. If your answer is incorrect, you will
see the same sequence again.
The timer in blue indicates how long you have been working on the current task. This timer
restarts for each letter sequence.
The timer in yellow next to the input field shows you how long it took you to solve the
previous task.
The number of correctly solved letter sequences is displayed in green.
At the top of the screen you will see the remaining time within the section.
You can select the leisure option on the right side of the screen.
On the next page, you will be explained exactly how the work task works and you will get
the relevant information (timer, sequences, input field, leisure option) explained.
Do you have any questions?
16
Figure A8: Screen 05
Screen 05 - English
Examples of sequences of letters
On this page you will find examples of sequences of letters. All relevant elements (different
timers, number of solved sequences and the leisure option) are explained here. Please click on
“Start Tour” to get all elements explained.
Familiarize yourself with the elements and try to solve some letter sequences. Solved sequences
will not count towards your payoff.
Start Tour
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Figure A9: Screen 05 - Tour 1
Screen 05 - Tour 1 - English
Time remaining
This timer indicates how much time you have left either for solving tasks in a section or how
much time you can spend in the “Leisure Option”. In this example, the timer is static so that
you have enough time to familiarize yourself with the task. In the actual task, the timer will
start as soon as the section starts.
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Figure A10: Screen 05 - Tour 2
Screen 05 - Tour 2 - English
This timer indicates how much time you have already spent solving a letter sequence. The timer
restarts when you have entered the correct solution for a letter sequence.
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Figure A11: Screen 05 - Tour 3
Screen 05 - Tour 3 - English
This counter indicates how many letter sequences you have already solved correctly in this section.
20
Figure A12: Screen 05 - Tour 4
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Screen 05 - Tour 4 - English
This timer indicates how many seconds it took you to solve the previous letter sequence.
Figure A13: Screen 05 - Tour 5
Screen 05 - Tour 5 - English
If you select this option, you must confirm this first. Once you have selected the Leisure option,
you cannot return to the letter sequence section.
Now try to give a correct answer for the existing letter sequence and observe how the different
timers and counters change.
22
Figure A14: Screen 05 - Trial switch confirmation
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Screen 05 - Trial switch confirmation - English
Are you sure you want to choose the Leisure Option? Once you have selected the Leisure Option,
you cannot return to the Letter Sequences section.
In this example, you can switch back from the Leisure Option to the Work task. Please note
that this is not possible in later sections. Once you have selected the Leisure Option, you cannot
return to the work item.
Figure A15: Screen 05 - Trial switch screen
Screen 05 - Trial switch screen - English
You have solved 0 sequences.
You would get in the Leisure Option: 80 Tokens In this example, you can switch back from
24
the Leisure Option to the work item. Please note that this is not possible in later sections. Once
you have selected the free time option, you cannot return to the work item.
Figure A16: Screen 06
Screen 06 - English
Payment modalities
This study consists of a total of four sections in which you must make work decisions that
can ultimately affect your payoff. For each correctly solved letter sequence you will receive 300
Tokens (TK).
Your payout will be calculated from the sum of the tokens obtained in all sections. 100 Tokens
correspond to this:
100 Tokens = 0.10 EUR
You start each section with the solution of short letter sequences. The length of the sequences
is constantly increased. The sequences and their order are identical for all participants. All
participants must also count the same letter “a”, so that they all face the same task.
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Figure A17: Screen 07
Screen 07 - English
Deductions
Your work performance within the study will be subject to deductions, as in real life. This
means that deductions are made for your earned performance (i.e. the income from the number
of tasks completed). These deductions are 40.0%.
Example: You solve 10 work tasks during one section. You will receive 3000 tokens for this.
Of this number of tokens, 40.0% (1200 tokens) are deducted.
You will receive 1800 tokens for your payout + the tokens from the Leisure Option.
Figure A18: Screen 08
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Screen 08 - English
Sequence of a section
At the end of each section you will receive a salary statement showing your performance,
deductions and payment.
After completion of all sections of the study, a short questionnaire follows. As soon as all
participants have completed the questionnaire, the payment will be made. The total processing
time takes about 45 minutes.
Figure A19: Screen 09
Screen 09 - English
Section 1
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Figure A20: Screen 10
Screen 10 - English
Your task is to complete work tasks within 3 minutes. The tasks consist of identifying the correct
number of letters “a” from a sequence of letters.
You will receive 300 Tokens for each correctly solved task.
You must deduct 40.0% from your earned performance.
If you choose the Leisure Option, you will receive a fixed amount of 200 Tokens for every 10
seconds you spend in this option. There are no deductions on free time.
Figure A21: Screen 11
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Screen 11 - English
Are you ready to start?
When you click Start, this section begins.
Figure A22: Screen 12
Screen 12 - English
Section 1
Remaining time in this section:
Instructions Your task is to identify the correct number of letters from a sequence of letters,
the letter “a”.
This section takes 3 minutes. You can also select the Leisure Option at any time.
29
Figure A23: Screen 13
Screen 13 - English
You are now in the “Leisure Option”. You have solved 1 sequence.
You get in the Leisure Option: 200 Tokens
30
Figure A24: Screen 14
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Screen 14 - English
This form contains specific technical terms used in Austrian remuneration statements which may
not have a direct translation and will therefore not be translated.
Figure A25: Screen 15 - stage 3 instructions: change to 20% IWC
Screen 15 - change to 20% IWC - English
Attention: There has been a change in the design of the deductions. You must now make 20.0%
deductions from your earned performance (previously 40.0%).
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Figure A26: Screen 15 - stage 3 instructions: change to 60% IWC
Screen 15 - change to 60% IWC - English
Attention: There has been a change in the design of the deductions. You must now make 60.0%
deductions from your earned performance (previously 40.0%).
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Figure A27: Screen 16
Screen 16 - English
Questionnaire
What is your age in years? What is your sex? What is the postcode of your residence?
Figure A28: Screen 17
Screen 17 - English
In politics, one speaks of left and right. Where would you personally classify yourself if the value
0 meant “left” and the value 10 “right”?
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Figure A29: Screen 18
Screen 18 - English
Have you already worked as an employee (e.g. during internships, part-time jobs or full-time
positions)? yes/no
Please indicate the total number of months of these employment contracts:
Figure A30: Screen 19
Screen 19 - English
How informative did you find the payslips received in the individual sections?
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Figure A31: Screen 20
Screen 20 - English
Do you think that the deductions on your earned performance are too high?
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Figure A32: Screen 21
Screen 21 - English
In your opinion, which contributions could be saved?
Securing insolvency fees, housing subsidy, accident insurance, occupational pension provision,
municipal tax, unemployment insurance, health insurance, family equalization fund, pension
insurance, chamber of labor allocation, payroll tax
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Figure A33: Screen 22
Screen 22 - English
Are there any smaller levies that you would reduce or eliminate altogether?
Insolvency fee protection, housing subsidy, company accident insurance, occupational pension
provision, chamber of labor allocation, municipal taxes
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Figure A34: Screen 23
39
Screen 23 - English
Does an employer in Austria have to pay dues in addition to the gross salary of an employee?
Figure A35: Screen 24
Screen 24 - English
Have the payslips received in the sections before influenced your behavior?
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Figure A36: Screen 25
Screen 25 - English
Finally, you have the opportunity to leave comments or feedback.
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Figure A37: Screen 26
Screen 26 - English
Thank you. Please remain seated so that the other participants can finish the study.
We will call you for payment.
D Framed cover sheets to the standard payslip, varied by treatment
As indicated in Figure 1, in the treatments MIN, MIN gross, MIN-G gross, MIN-C gross and
MAX-G gross, a cover sheet was provided in addition to the traditional payslip. Figures A38 -
A42 display the respective screenshots of the cover sheets used in the experiment.
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Figure A38: Treatment: MIN
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Figure A39: Treatment: MIN gross
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Figure A40: Treatment: MIN-G gross
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Figure A41: Treatment: MIN-C gross
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Figure A42: Treatment: MAX-G gross
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